US Army Training With Ukrainian Drone Operators Shows Armor’s Role Is Still Up for Debate

Capt. Allan W. Watson, commander of Blackhawk Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, described an April training exercise at Hohenfels Training Area in Germany. His soldiers faced Hohenfels’ dedicated opposition force, the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, with support from the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Force’s 412 Regiment, known as “Nemesis.”

The Ukrainian unit brought combat experience with and against drones, creating a demanding test for US troops using armored vehicles in a drone-heavy environment.

Persistent drone surveillance exposed US troop movements and put combat vehicles at risk during the simulated battle. Watson wrote that US forces did not have the counter-drone capabilities they wanted, forcing them to adapt their tactics rather than rely on a single technical fix.

The key lesson was practical: troops had to think constantly about how they appeared from above and adjust movement, concealment, and routes accordingly.

Watson’s soldiers changed how they used Bradleys and other armored assets. They hid Bradleys in gullies and among trees, used terrain to mask maneuvers, avoided predictable routes, and deliberately considered drone observation when moving toward objectives.

Watson wrote that “the enemy still found us,” but said drones alone did not complete the fight: ground reconnaissance and infiltration were still needed to exploit what drones detected.

US forces lost Bradleys and tanks during the high-pressure exercise, which Watson said was expected in training meant to resemble real conflict. But he argued those losses did not prove armor is irrelevant.

His conclusion was that armor can still provide mobility, protection, and firepower if used with the drone threat in mind. The broader debate continues as Ukraine’s war keeps showing both the danger drones pose to armored vehicles and the enduring value commanders see in armor when tactics adapt.